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RICHARD M. CARP 
ANANDA K. Coomaraswamy. curator of Indian art at the 
Boston Museum of Fine An, was a revolutionary figure in 
Oriental, especially Indian, art history. He was also a philoso-
pher of substantial power who articulated a set of notions about 
art that Tan counter to the prevailing modernisms of his day. OUT 
own time. engaged in reevaluating modernisms, may be better 
able to appreciate and benefit from his ideas. In this paper I will 
consider those ideas as they are set out in a small book, Chris/ian 
and Oriental Philosophy ofArt, first published in 1943 under the 
title Why Exhibit Works ofArt', and consisting of nine lectures 
and essays originally published separately. 
There are irritating flaws in Coomaraswamy's concepts and 
presentation. He has the diction of a British schoolmaster. and 
the reader tends to resent being talked down to in a condescend-
ing and patriarchal manner. He is also a resolute medievalist and 
Seems to believe that for most people life in a Medieval Euro-
pean or traditionaL Indian village was happy and fulfilling. The 
fundamental issues at stake in his philosophy. however, in no 
way depend either on patriarchy or medievalism. A more 
important issue is his apparent platonism; but, as we shall see, 
his philosophy is amenable to a processual reading that identi-
fies truth with a continuously relational response to the flow of 
events rather than with eternally fixed ideas. 
All human action, according to Coomaraswamy, involves 
both power/knowledge and will. Art is a matter of power/ 
knowledge. while ethics concerns the will. We do not make 
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"art," but artifacts. for "'he art remains in the artist and is the 
knowledge by which things are made" (1956, p. 18).' Because all 
things are made by art, "there can be no good use, that is 
effective use. without art" (p. 83). "Beauty ... is the attractive 
power of perfection'· (p. 28). Each thing is beautiful in its own 
kind; its beauty must be judged according to the fullness with 
which it realizes that kind. 
Just as we cannot say that a frog is any more or less 
beautiful than a man, whatever our preferences may be, 
so wecannol possibly say that a telephone booth as such 
is any more or less beautiful than a cathedral as such. (p. 
76) 
ISo1The artist as such is an amoral type. (p. 83) 
there can be no moral judgement of art itself. since it is 
not an act but a kind of knowledge or power by which 
things can be well made, whether for good or evil use: 
the art by which utilities are produced cannot be judged 
morally, because it is not a kind of willing but a kind of 
knowing. (p. 28) 
Although art and ethics can be distinguished analytieally, 
existentially such a separation amounts to what Coomaraswamy 
calls "adisintegration ofpersonaLity" (p. 83). As a human being, 
the artist is "responsible for all that his will consents to" (p. 83). 
Human actions are therefore subject to two correlated 
judgements-the judgement of beauty and the judgement of 
prudence. Art, as arl. has no ethical dimension. An atomic 
bomb. or a telephone booth, can be as beautiful, as artful, as a 
painting or a chapel. 
There is no distinction in principle of orator from carpen-
ter, but only a distinction of things well and truly made 
from things not so made and of what is beautiful from 
what is ugly in terms of fonnality and informality.... 
"Noble" is an ethical value, and pertains to the a priori 
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censorship of what ought or ought not to be made at all. 
The judgement of works of art from this point of view is 
not merely legitimate. but essential to a good life and the 
welfare of humanity. Butit is not ajudgementofthe work 
of art as such. The bomb, for example, is only bad as a 
work of art if it fails to destroy and kill to the required 
extenl. (p. 27) 
At the same time. because art is required for any human 
action, artists arc not special people; every person is a special 
kind of artist, with the power/knowledge to effect actions (p. 
24). "Everyone is naturally a doer, patron and consumer; and at 
the same time an artist, that is to say a maker by art, in some 
specialized sense" (p. 67), except, perhaps, the "mere idler and 
parasite" (p. 98). This means that, for Coomaraswamy, judge-
ments we usually reserve for "works of art" are applicable to all 
elements of culture. The judgements of art and prudence are 
universally applicable, so that "all possessions that are not at the 
same time beautiful and useful are an affront to human dignity" 
(p.49). 
What, then, is the use of those artifacts we are accustomed to 
calling "art" in the narrower sense of the term: works of fine art, 
architecture and design? Until we know this. we cannot question 
them with respect to their ethical dimension, for ethics, posing 
the question of prudence, asks whether the thing done is worth 
doing, as the question of art asks whether it is done well. 
Perhaps, Coomaraswamy ponders, works of art that do not 
serve the body's needs may still "serve those of our soul, or if 
you prefer the word, Qurreason. ... as the Upanishad reminds us. 
'one comes to be ofjust such stuff as that on which the mind is 
set'" (p. 10). 
If [a non-utilitarian artifact] is not about something, and 
not for anything, it has no use. And furthennore, unless it 
is about something Worth while ... to the patron and con-
sumer as well as to the artist and maker, it has no real use. 
(p.90) 
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The purpose of non-utilitarian artifacts is to fix the mind. Of 
course, many utilitarian artifacts perform this function, too; a 
fact that is more openly appreciated in other cultures. but 
remains trlle in ours as welJ.2 Since we become like what the 
mind is fixed on, artis prudent which fixes the mind on what it is 
good to become. This view is coherent with that expressed by 
many artists about their work: 
Robert Motherwell wrote "one's an is jllst one's effort to 
wed oneself to the universe. to unify oneself through 
union." Max Beckman claimed, "Art is creati ve for the 
sake of realization, not for amusement; for transfigura-
tion, not for the sake of play." (Carp, in press) 
Coomaraswamy notes repeatedly that anmaking is a rite. an 
act intrinsic to the transformation of the maker (see. for ex-
ample, pp. 39 and 80). Yet, he sees art as more than a yogic act of 
personal enlightenment. Although Motherwell and Beckman 
may seem, at first, to view art in this way. the public dimensions 
of their activities belie this. In showing their work, they demon-
strate their desire to unify and transfigure more than just 
themselves. 
This rhetoric is common among contemporary artists. Robert 
Morris seeks work that "extends presentness as a conscious 
experience" (1978, p. 80). Artist Robert Irwin, in 1982, said: 
when I walk down the street I no longer, at least to the 
same degree, bring the world into focus in the same way. 
My whole visual structure is changed by the fact that I'm 
now using an entirely different process of going at it. So 
the implications of that kind of art are very rash-I mean, 
in time they have the ability to change every single thing 
in the culture itself. (cited in Wechsler, 1982b, p. 102) 
According to architect Christopher Alexander: 
When you build a thing you cannot merely build that 
thing in isolation, but must also repair the world around 
27 26 ART & ACADEME 
censorship of what ought or ought not to be made at alL 
The judgement of works of art from this point of view is 
not merely legitimate, but essential to a good life and tbe 
welfare ofhumanity. But it is not ajudgement of the work 
of art as such. The bomb, for example, is only bad as a 
work of art if it fails to destroy and kill to the required 
extent. (p. 27) 
At the same time, because art is required for any human 
action. artists are not special people; every person is a special 
kind of artist, witb tbe power!knowledge to effect actions (p. 
24). "Everyone is naturally a doer, patron and consumer; and at 
the same time an artist, that is to say a maker by art, in some 
specialized sense" (p. 67), except, perhaps, the "mere idler and 
parasite" (p. 98). This means that, for Coomaraswamy, judge-
ments we usually reserve for "works of art" are applicable to all 
elements of culture. The judgements of art and prudence are 
universally applicable, so that "all possessions that are not at the 
same time beautiful and useful arc an affront to human dignity" 
(p.49). 
What, then, is the use of those artifacts we are accustomed to 
calling "art" in the narrower sense of the teml: works of fine art. 
architecture and design? Until we know this, we cannot question 
them with respect to their ethical dimension, for ethics, posing 
the question of prudence, asks whether the thing done is wonh 
doing. as the question of art asks whether it is done well. 
Perhaps, Coomaraswamy ponders, works of art that do not 
serve the body's needs may still "serve those of our soul, or if 
you prefer the word, our reason.... as the Upanishad reminds us, 
'one comes to be of just such stuff as that on which the mind is 
set'" (p. 10). 
If [a non-utilitarian anifaet] is not about something, and 
not for anything. it has no use. And furthermore, unless it 
is about something Worth while ... to the patron and con-
sumer as weB as to the artist and maker, it has no real use. 
(p.90) 
Rereading Coomaraswamy 
The purpose of non-utilitarian artifacts is to fix the mind. Of 
course, many utilitarian artifacts perform this function, too; a 
fact that is mOTe openly appreciated in other cultures, but 
remains true in ours as weiLl Since we become like what the 
mind is fixed on. art is prudent which fixes the mind on whatitis 
good to become. This vicw is coherent with that expressed by 
many artists about their work: 
Roben Motherwell wrote "one's art is just one's effon to 
wed oneself to the universe, to unify oneself through 
union." Max Beckman claimed, "Art is creative for the 
sake of realization, not for amusement; for transfigura-
tion, not for the sake ofplay." (Carp, in press) 
Coomaraswamy notes repeatedly that artmaking is a rite, an 
act intrinsic to the transformation of the maker (see, for ex~ 
ample, pp. 39 and 80). Yet, he sees an as more than a yogic act of 
personal enlightenment. Although Motherwell and Beckman 
may seem. at first, to view art in this way. the public dimensions 
of their activities belie this.]n showing their work, they demon-
strate their desire to unify and transfigure more than just 
themselves. 
This rhetoric is common among contemporary artists. Robert 
Morris seeks work that "extends presentness as a consclous 
experience" (1978, p. 80). Anist Roben Irwin, in 1982, said: 
when I walk down the street] no longer. at least to the 
same degree. bring the world into focus in the same way. 
My whole visual structure is changed by the fact that I'm 
now using an entirely different process of going at it. So 
the implications of that kind of art are very rash-I mean, 
in time they have the ahility to change every single thing 
in the culture itself. (cited in Wechsler, 1982b, p. 102) 
According to architect Christopher Alexander: 
When you build a thing you cannot merely build that 
thing in isolation, but must also repair the world around 
28 ART & ACADEME 
it. and within it so that the larger world at that one place 
becomes more coherent. and more whole. (sec Alexan-
der.lshikawa. & Silverstein. 1977, p. xiii) 
Of course [such aJ thing is physically different. but it is 
also psychically quite different. It's completely different 
to live in such a place. It causes genuine political and 
emotional change. (Alexander. ciled in Grabow, 1983, p. 
159) 
An individual artwork may have limited power to fix: the 
mind. It probably does preoccupy the artist during its creation 
and it may support the contemplation of its owner or those who 
see it in a gallery or museum, but its scope is limited. Art, 
however, goes beyond individual artifacts; it is the material 
imagination that permeates the cultural landscape. As such, it 
plays a profound role in the processes by which perception is 
consrructed, maintained and transformed (see Carp, in press). 
"In large part perception is learned in infancy through 
interaction wilh the child's built environment (the cultural 
landscape)" (Carp. 1989, p. 69). The body may be considered 
the first artifact of material cullure. imagined, created and re-
ceived by each person in the activity of growing up. Habituated 
body rhythms, body postures and characteristic physical ten-
sions are culturally learned. embedded in our bodies and lost 
from direct experience. 
"Each culture," says anthropologist E.T. Hall, "has its 
own characteristic manner of locomotion, sitting, stand-
ing, reclining and gesturing." We learn the kinesics of 
our culture and habituate them. forgotten deep in our 
bodies. where even our characteristic rhythms are arti-
facts ofcultural learning. (Carp, 1989, p. 70) 
Cultural learning permeates our perception of the apparently 
external world as well, for internal and external appear in mutual 
relationship in the act of perception. As Merleau-Ponty (1962) 
showed. in The Phenomenology ofPerception, "every external 
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perception is immediately synonymous with a certain percep-
tion of my body" (p. 206). "External perception and the percep-
tion of one's own body vary in conjunction because they are two 
facets of one and the same act" (p. 205). As Ittelson and 
Kilpatrick (1973) have shown, "Object and percept are part and 
parcel of the same thing" (p. 174). 
Even our direct temporal and spatial experience are cultur-
ally learned. E.T. Hall (1969) writes: 
When Westerners think and talk aboUl space, they mean 
the distance between objects. In the West, we are taught 
to perceive and to react to the arrangements of objects 
and to think of space as "empty." The meaning of this 
becomes clear only when it is contrasted with the Japa-
nese, who are trained to give meaning to spaces-to per-
ceive the shape and arrangement of spaces; for this they 
have a word, rna. The ma, or interval, is a basic building 
block in all Japanese spatial experience. (p. 153) 
Perception is not a registration of a world which exists apart 
from the perceptual acts in which it appears. It is a constructive 
act in which the person forms the world which appears, includ-
ing the ways in which the person appears in that world. Like 
most human acts, world-construction is learned in infancy from 
cultural sources. It differs profoundly in individuals from differ-
ent cultures, who literally "'inhabit different sensory worlds." 
Perception is a tradition, handed down from generation to 
generation and varying from one culture to another and from 
historical period to historical period within one culture. 
For example, history has not yet fully told the story ofthe 
early development of science in the West. Western sci· 
ence is, of course. based on the mathematicization of the 
physical world. The spatial continuum was first sub-
jected to uniform mathematical analysis in the vanishing 
point perspective paintings of the Renaissance. Through 
the application of this mathematical analysis, painters 
could create the experience of a seemingly consistent and 
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the application of this mathematical analysis, painters 
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rational perceptual space. Soon this abstract spatial con­
struction was applied to the design of city squares, then to 
private estates. and then to the organization of larger and 
larger units of design. Alberti provided the mathematics 
for painters in 1435; nearly two cenluries later Newton, 
Leibniz and Descartes completed the analytical mathe­
maticization of space in the calculus. They lived in a 
cultural landscape permeated with the (no longer new) 
space invented and created in Renaissance painting. 
Renaissance painting opened a new distance between 
viewer and what is represented in the painting through 
the convention of the "window." This distance is rewrit­
ten in landscape and urban design in terms of the "view." 
Without extensive research one can only speculate on the 
relationship between this new spatial experience and 
Descartes' division of the world into two discontinuous 
realms, the "cogitans" (equivalent to the viewer) and the 
"extensa" (equivalent to the view). 
"Renaissance space" and the structures of thought 
and experience that correlate with it became normative in 
the structure of experience in the West. Any awareness 
that this space was constructed eventuaUy vanished and 
was replaced with a sense that it was "natural" space. As 
John Russell says in The Meanings a/Modem Art (1981, 
p.31): 
By taking as its first premise a single point of 
vision, perspective had stabilized a visual experi­
ence. It had bestowed order on chaos; it allowed 
elaborate and systematized cross-referencing, and 
quite soon it had become a touchstone of coher­
ence and evenmindedness. To "lose all sense of 
perspective" is to this day a synonym for mental 
collapse. Yet perspective, before Cezanne. was 
fundamentally one of the sanctified frauds that 
keep the world turning: aconspiracy todeceive,in 
other words .... Cezanne rebuilt the experience of 
seeing. (Carp, 1989, pp. 71-72) 
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Thus, art fixes the mind, not merely of individuals, but of 
cultures, generating fundamental experiences of temporality, 
spatiality, and personhood. This insight is coming back to us in 
myriad ways. Edward Hall's ground-breaking anthropological 
work has demonstrated the great variety of spatial and temporal 
experiences encoded in varying cultural landscapes. Much of 
contemporary feminism shows how the representation ofwomen 
has formed and continues to form women's self·experience 
(see, for example, the collection ofessays in The Femnle Body ill 
Western Culture: COlltemporary Perspectives [1986], edited by 
Susan Suleiman, and Margaret Miles's Carnal Knowing: Fe­
maLe Nakedness and Religious Meaning in the Christian West 
11989]).lnlcanchu's Drum: An Orientation to Mealling illSouth 
American Religions (1988), Laurence Sullivan provides a bril­
liant presentation of an entire region, that of indigenous South 
America, in which material culture is recognized as the funda­
mental bearer of meaning. Among indigenous South Ameri­
cans, text, elevated in the West to the sine qua non of meaning, is 
just another form of textile. while the activities of music, 
weaving, dance and canoe building take the forefront in the self­
conscious construction of meaning. In Darsan, Diana uk 
(1981) shows that the experience of seeing and being seen is phe­
nomenologically and existentially different in the Hindu con­
text than in the contemporary West. 
Because of the role of art in cultural processes of perceptual 
structuring. Coomaraswamy notes that: 
the anthropologist whose interest is in aculture is a better 
historian of such arts than is the critic whose only interest 
is in the aesthetic surfaces of the artifacts themselves. (p. 
48)' 
Says Coomaraswamy: 
The current approach may be compared to that of a 
traveller who, when he finds a signpost, proceeds to 
31 30 ART & ACADEME 
rational perceptual space. Soon this abstract spatial con-
struction was applied to the design of city squares, then to 
private estates. and then to the organization of larger and 
larger units of design. Alberti provided the mathematics 
for painters in 1435: nearly two centuries later Newton, 
Leibniz and Descartes completed the analytical mathe-
maticization of space in the calculus. They lived in a 
cultural landscape permeated with the (no longer new) 
space invented and created in Renaissance painting. 
Renaissance painting opened a new distance between 
viewer and what is represented in the painting through 
the convention of the "window.,. This distance is rewrit-
ten in landscape and urban design in tenns of the "view." 
Without extensive research one can only speculate on the 
relationship between this new spatial experience and 
Descartes' division of the world into two discontinuous 
realms, the "cogitans" (equivalent to the viewer) and the 
"extensa" (equivalent to the view). 
"Renaissance space" and the structures of thought 
and experience thatcorrelate with it became nonnative in 
the structure of experience in the West. Any awareness 
that this space was constructed eventually vanished and 
was replaced with a sense that it was "natural" space. As 
John Russell says in The Meanings a/Modem Art (1981. 
p.31): 
By taking as its first premise a single point of 
vision, perspective had stabilized a visual experi-
ence. It had bestowed order on chaos; it allowed 
elaborate and systematized cross-referencing, and 
quite soon it had become a touchstone of coher-
ence and evenmindedness. To "lose all sense of 
perspective" is to this day a synonym for mental 
collapse. Yet perspective, before Cezanne. was 
fundamentally one of the sanctified frauds that 
keep the world turning: aconspiracy to deceive, in 
other words.... Cezanne rebuilt the experience of 
seeing. (Carp, 1989, pp. 71-72) 
Rereading Coomaraswamy 
Thus, art fixes the mind, not merely of individuals, but of 
cultures, generating fundamental experiences of temporality, 
spatiality. and personhood. This insight is coming back to us in 
myriad ways. Edward Hairs ground-breaking anthropological 
work has demonstrated the great variety of spatial and temporal 
experiences encoded in varying cultural landscapes. Much of 
contemporary feminism shows how the representation ofwomen 
has formed and continues to form women's self-experience 
(see, for example. the collection ofessays in The Female Body in 
Western Culture: Contemporary Perspectives [1986], edited by 
Susan Suleiman, and Margaret Miles's CarMI Knowing: Fe-
male Nakedness and Religious Meaning in the Christian West 
[1989]). In Icanchu's Drum: An Orientation to Meaning inSoulh 
American Religions (1988), Laurence Sullivan provides a bril-
liant presentation of an entire region, that of indigenous South 
America, in which material culture is recognized as the funda-
mental bearer of meaning. Among indigenous South Ameri-
cans, text, elevated in the West to the sine qua non of meaning, is 
just another form of textile, while the activities of music, 
weaving, dance and canoe building take the forefront in the self-
conscious construction of meaning. In Dorsan, Diana Eck 
(1981) shows that the experience of seeing and being seen is phe-
nomenologically and existentially different in the Hindu con-
text than in the contemporary West. 
Because of the role of art in cultural processes of perceptual 
structuring, Coomaraswamy notes that: 
the anthropologist whose interest is in a cuhure is a better 
historian of such arts than is the critic whose only interest 
is in the aesthetic surfaces of the artifacts themselves. (p, 
48)3 
Says Coomaraswamy: 
The current approach may be compared to that of a 
traveller who, when he tinds a signpost, proceeds to 
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admire its elegance, to ask who made it, and finally cuts it 
down and decides to use it as a mantelpiece ornament. (p. 
108) 
An malters in the process by which humans become. In 
expressing this, Coomaraswamy participates in a long tradition 
of philosophical thought. "To Aristotle, learning is pleasure and 
the meaningful is the beautiful. not the other way round" (Jones, 
1990, p. 37). The purpose of art is meaning, not pleasure. For 
Coomaraswamy: 
This is not an exclusion of pleasure from life as if 
pleasure were wrong in itself. it is an exclusion of the 
pursuit of pleasure thought of as a "diversion," and apart 
from "life." It is in life itself. in "proper operation" that 
pleasure arises naturally ... in the case of the pleasures of 
use or the understanding of use. (p. 26) 
[that someone] takes pleasure. or may take pleasure. in 
doing well or in making well, does not suffice to make of 
this pleasure the purpose of... work, except in the case of 
[one] who is self-righteous or ... who is merely a self-
expressionist: just as the pleasure of eating cannot be 
called the final end of eating. (p.96) 
We eat to live, we do not live to eat. We work to live, we do not 
live to work. Art, too, is for life, not life for art. Art fixes the 
mind, and we become like what the mind is fixed upon. Art is 
prudent that fixes the mind on what it is good to become. 
Either art is real, matters, has meaning, makes, as Gregory 
Bateson (1979) said, "a difference that makes a difference" or it 
does not. If it does not, it is a waste of time, mere pleasure 
without sustenance, like gluttony. If it does, then we need to 
understand it and respect it. One can go to a contemporary 
supermarket and buy goods which look like food, smell like 
food, taste like food, yet provide no nourishment: they are not 
food; in fact, some of them may actually be harmful. Likewise, 
one may be able to find artifacts that look, smell and taste like 
J 
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art, yet are not art. In fact, some of them may actually be harmful. 
The only alternative to this conclusion is that art is ineffectual 
and pointless: what cannot be harmful cannot be beneficial. 
Ethieally practiced fine art and design involve the full 
exereise of conscience, for: 
art is a conscience about form, precisely as prudence is a I I 
conscience about conduct,-a conscience in both senses 
of the word. I.e., both as rule and as awareness.4 II 
(Coomaraswamy, p. 70) 
" 
But how are we to evaluate the prudence of a work of art and who 
is to do so? This is a profound and difficult question, but it is no 
different for works of fine art and design than for any other 
human activity, all of which are more or less prudent as well as 
more or less beautiful. We have simply entered the general arena 
of the ethics of speech and the related arena ofepistemology and 
the nature ofrruth. As Elizabeth Jones says: 
Art praxis restores meaning, rather than transcends mean-
ing, when it remembers that the intrinsic values of art are 
the same values underlying the moral and the practical 
realms. (1990, p. 51) 
JThis conclusion does not rest on a belief in the decidability I~ I 
either of meaning or of ethics. There is, as Derrida says. an 
inescapable, continual supplement, a difference, in human af-
fairs, and the ascription of this is asserts the ambiguity involved 
in the necessity and impossibility of undermining assertion. 
This is the condition both of possibility and of impossi-
bility for any transcendental subjectivity. A decipher-
able-undecipherable unit or unity. (Derrida, 1981, p. 
364) 
It seems that Coomaraswamy may believe in a metaphysical 
certitude that would allow possession of rruth in certain human 
societies. He states that in a unanimous society censorship can 
il. 
'I 
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364) 
It seems that Coomaraswamy may believe in a metaphysical 
certitude that would allow possession of truth in certain human 
societies. He states that in a unanimous society censorship can 
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be practiced by an elite class, "whose vocation it is to know 
metaphysical truth" (p. 85). As with Plato's advocacy of censor­
ship in a perfect society, this can be read two ways: either as an 
affirmation of the practical desirability of censorship or as an 
ironic commentary on the necessary imperfection of any pos­
sible society. The question is undecidable; what is clear is that 
the text does not require belief in censorship. Rather, it drives us 
deeply into inescapable questions of human conduct, society 
and responsibility. The world is ambiguous. uncertain and 
consequential. We cannot be sure about the prudence of our 
actions, but we know that different actions lead in different 
directions. Only oUicomes can lell us what direction is prefer~ 
able, and each outcome is preliminary. New outcomes may 
bring strange reversals and ovenurn previousjudgements. 
Both undecidability and the inescapability of choosing a 
course of action are inherent in our situation. The notion of pure 
relativism, that all actions are equivalent and no action can be 
chosen as preferable, is both bad faith and intellectual dishon­
esty. Espousing relativism is choosing one course over another. 
Relativism itself is historical, situational, contextual and 
constructed. It is not possible not to stand in a tradition, to 
take up no ethical stance in the world. (Carp, in press) 
The notion of "fixing the mind on what it is good to become" 
is related to that of"telling the truth." In Coomaraswamy we can 
glimpse a clue to a vision of truth-telling adequate to the 
uncenain consequentiality of our lives. In the chapter called "Is 
Art a Superstition or a Way of LifeT' he notes that sharpening a 
blade is called "truing" a knife (p. 74). "Truing" may be a more 
fruitful concept than "truth," for the human condition is, per~ 
haps, more process than stasis, more verb than noun. When one 
is skiing down a hill, the overall objective is "balance," but at 
each moment the specific content required to achieve that 
objective transforms: "lean a bit to the left," "to the right," "sit 
back," "speed up," "lean forward and slow down. " 
The end is not to be confused with the means, nor are those 
good means which may seem to be good in themselves, but those 
Rereading Coomaraswamy 
which are good in the given application (Coomaraswamy, p. 
106). Life is more like a balancing act and less like a pure 
description of static "essences" remaining unchanged behind a 
transforming surface. The "ends" of life~joy,  fullness, loving 
and being loved--<:annot be reached through any predetermined 
path. "Good means" to them must be found in each application, 
moment to moment. 
"Thought, knowledge and understanding are mapping ac­
ti vities; through them we develop maps or guides for the 
conduct of experience" (Carp, in press). We are constantly 
reminded of Korzybsky's dictum (1958, p. 58) that the map is 
not the territory. What we may miss is that we are, altogether, 
map crearures: the territory is only a rumor. My experienee of 
"myself" is not myself any more than my experience of a tree is a 
tree. At no point can [leave the realm of the map to enter "reality 
itself." This is the great insight of contemporary deconstructive 
philosophy. Our experience of our lives occurs on the surface of 
our maps. In fact. our experience of our lives is not our lives; 
even this is map-like. Yet, our maps guide us in the conduct of 
our lives. They are validated, not by their correspondence to the 
territory (which can never be ascertained), but by outcomes in 
our lives. To return to the skiing analogy, they are validated by 
our remaining balanced to the bottom of the slope. 
In skiing the goals are self-evident. In life they are not. Art 
participates in the ongoing public discourse through which we 
try to ascertain them. The adequacy of our decisions regarding 
them can only be concluded retrospectively and uncertainly, yet 
they must be made. In all our actions we strive for that prudence 
which Coomaraswamy describes as doing what is worth doing. 
"Art," says Coomaraswamy, "is the imitation of the nature of 
things, not of their appearances (p. 19) ... that is to say, an 
imitation of nature, not as effect, but as cause" (p. 73). Art­
making is truth-telling, and because reality is creative, produc­
tive, and processual, the truth it tells is nota copy of things but of 
creative, productive process-of truing. The ethics of art are the 
ethics of becoming, of individual and collective self-creation. 
Although we can determine it only after the fact, and only 
tentatively and uncertainly, good art, prudent art, fixes our 
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reminded of Korzybsky's dictum (1958, p. 58) that the map is 
not the territory. What we may miss is that we are, altogether, 
map creatures: the territory is only a rumor. My experience of 
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minds on what it is good to become. 
Notes 
1. This raises the poSSibility of evalualing the artist separately from LheartifarL The 
intent of the artisl is relevant to evaluating the anisl~  il is not relevant in evaluaLing 
the arlilacl. 
2. Among the Jivaro- Wuechua, for example, potlCry making is coordinaled with 
shamanism and granted equal Sl..atus becauseof its spiritual power. 
3. A similarpoinlismade by Stephen Melville(l990). 
4. 'Form' in the tradilionalphilosophy docs nOlmean tangible shape, bUlis synony-
mous with idea and even wilh soul; the soul, for example, is called the form of the 
body. If there bea real unily of form and maHer, such as we CJ;pect ina work of art, 
the shapeof its body will express its form (Coomarnswamy, p. 17). 
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